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The Legacy of the Dinosaurs: Regulation of Planetary Defence and Near Earth 
Objects at a global level 
George Leloudas1, Michael Chatzipanagiotis2, and Konstantina Liperi3 
 
 
In recent years, Near Earth Objects (NEOs) have caused increasing concerns amongst 
space scientists and policy makers. While attacks on earth from NEOs are rare, the 
atmospheric impact of an about 20-meter asteroid near Chelyabinsk/Russia in February 
2013, served as a warning that asteroid/comet strikes could seriously threaten 
humanity4.  Planetary defence requires strong international co-operation. Despite the 
                                                          
1 Dr George Leloudas is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law 
of the College of Law and Criminology of Swansea University. He is a graduate of the National and 
Kapodistrian University (Athens), and holds LLM degrees in Commercial Law from the University of 
Bristol and in Air & Space Law from the Institute of Air and Space Law of McGill University. He also 
completed his PhD in aviation and liability insurance at Cambridge University. Before joining the 
Institute, he worked as an aviation Solicitor in London where he advised on aerospace liability and 
regulatory matters. He was also an assistant to the legal counsel of the International Union of Aviation 
Insurers in relation to the replacement of the Rome Convention on Surface Damage. George constantly 
produces new publications on private (international) air and maritime law, (aviation and marine) 
insurance law, multimodal transport, environmental law, and new transport technologies (see 
www.swansea.ac.uk/law/istl/research/researchrecord/associateprofessorgeorgeleloudas/) He is also 
one of the editors of the preeminent air law publication, Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law, being 
responsible for the liability chapters. Any view expressed herein are strictly personal and do not 
necessarily represent the views of an organizations he may be affiliated with. 
2 Dr. Michael Chatzipanagiotis is an attorney-at-law and a legal advisor based in Cyprus, as well as an 
adjunct lecturer of aviation law and European private law at the University of Cyprus and the European 
University of Cyprus. He specializes in aviation and space law, IPR and consumer protection. He has 
advised various aerospace companies and has worked as a legal expert in projects of the European 
Commission, Eurocontrol, the Lufthansa Group and the German Aerospace Center (DLR). He obtained 
his LL.B from the Law School of the University of Athens, Greece, and his LL.M from the Law School of 
the University of Cologne, Germany, where he subsequently wrote his PhD on suborbital flights. He 
holds seminars, presentations and guest lectures on his areas of expertise, while he has authored 
numerous publications in international law reviews. He is also an active member of the International 
Institute of Space Law. Any view expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily represent 
the views of an organizations he may be affiliated with. 
3 Mrs Konstantina Liperi works as a legal officer in the National Supervisory Authority (NSA) of the 
Department of Civil Aviation Authority in Cyprus. She obtained a Bachelor of Laws from Sheffield 
University in the UK and was called to UK (Honourable Society of Middle Temple) and Cyprus Bar. She 
also holds an LL.M (Adv.) in Air and Space Law from Leiden University in the Netherlands. Before joining 
the NSA, she was working as a legal officer in the Department of Electronic Communications of the 
Republic of Cyprus, where she advised on telecommunication and space law issues. She was also the 
national expert of Cyprus to the EU in relation to the European Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
(Galileo and EGNOS). She represented Cyprus in the European Commission's GNSS Programme 
Committee, in the European GNSS Agency's Administrative Board and in European Space Agency´s 
committees. Any view expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily represent the views 
of an organizations she may be affiliated with. 
4 Secure World Foundation, Near Earth Objects: Responding to the International Challenge, (April 
2014) p. 2, online:  <http://swfound.org/media/170684/SWF_NEOs-
Responding_to_the_International_Challenge_2014.pdf> (last visited on 15 January 2018). 
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initiatives at UNCOPUOS, international law falls considerably short of addressing 
issues pertaining to the detection and mitigation of hazardous NEOs.  
 
This paper builds upon the “risk society” of Ulrich Beck to propose the creation of a 
Convention on Planetary Defence. The Convention will address co-operation issues 
among States and, moreover, establish a Global Fund for Planetary Defence. This Fund 
will be used for R&D on NEOs, for identifying best practices in deterring potential 
attacks, and for compensating relevant damages. 
 
It is suggested, that the Convention creates a stand-alone international organisation that 
operates the Fund to fulfil the aforementioned objectives. Parallels will be drawn from 
various existing international/national arrangements dealing with disasters, such as 
terrorism, nuclear and pollution accidents. Yet, it will be demonstrated that the unique 
risk of NEOs requires a sui-generis solution. Furthermore, liability and recourse issues, 
including governmental liability for failing to mitigate NEOs strikes will be analysed. 
 
1. The threat of NEOs 
1.1. NEOs and PHOs 
Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) are planetary debris, created from the formation of our solar 
system some 4.6 billion years ago. They are mostly asteroids and comets that have been 
nudged by the gravitational attraction of nearby planets into orbits that intersect that of 
the Earth or are within 0.3 Astronomical Units.5  
These celestial bodies are the remnants of the primitive building blocks of the planets, 
called “planetesimals”.6 In essence, our giant planets were formed by the agglomeration 
of the planetesimals through several collisions. The asteroids and comets are the left 
over pieces that remained in orbit around the Sun.   
Comets are composed mostly of water ice with embedded dust particles and were 
originally formed in the cold outer planetary system. Asteroids are rocky or metallic 
bodies formed in the warmer inner solar system between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter. 
The composition, density and size of NEOs varies greatly and influences their 
behaviour when entering the Earth’s atmosphere and their reaction to 
countermeasures.7 
                                                          
5 Astronomers call the Earth to Sun distance one “Astronomical Unit”. See on definition of NEOs UK 
Task Force on potentially hazardous Near Earth objects, Report (September 2000), pp. 11-12, online:  
<http://www.nss.org/resources/library/planetarydefense/2000-
ReportOfTheTaskForceOnPotentiallyHazardousNearEarthObjects-UK.pdf> (last visited on 15 January 
2018);   
6 International Academy of Astronautics, Dealing with the threat to earth from asteroids and comets, 
Edited by I. Bekey, p.16, online:  
<http://swfound.org/media/167468/Dealing_With_Threat_To_Earth_Asteroids_Comets.pdf> (last 
visited on 15 January 2018)  
7 Ibid. 
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A Potential Hazardous Object is an object in our solar system that passes within 0.05 
AU (about 7.5 million km) of Earth’s orbit and is large enough, i.e. at least 50 meters 
in diameter to pass through Earth’s atmosphere and cause significant damage on 
impact.8 
 
1.2 The disastrous potential 
The odds of a cosmic collision happening during a human life span are significantly 
limited.  Threats arising from potential diseases, natural disasters, or auto accidents are 
much greater rather than a threat from a NEO impact.9 In fact, the vast majority of 
people are oblivious to the prospect of an asteroid or a comet strike.   
However, what are very tiny risks for impacts during a human lifetime become 
certainties on geologic time scales. The increasing understanding of the magnitudes and 
qualitative features of environmental consequences of impacts of objects suggest that 
prime attributes of impacts, not duplicated by any other natural processes, are (1) 
extreme suddenness, providing little opportunity for escape and no chance for 
adaptation, (2) globally pervasive, and (3) unlimited potential for overwhelming 
destruction of the life-sustaining characteristics of the fragile ecosphere.10 Our planet’s 
geological and biological history reveals that a series of destructive impact events have 
occurred throughout the years. Therefore, in recent years, the issue of planetary defence 
has become an increasing area of concern amongst the world’s space scientists, 
astronomers and policy makers.   
The now widely accepted theory that a NEO strike is responsible for the ultimate 
destruction of non-avian dinosaurs 65 million years ago, serves as a strong illustration 
of the disastrous potential such an impact may have. Yet, there are also relatively recent 
impact events. In 1908 an object, believed to be an asteroid or a comet, exploded over 
Tunguska River in Russia causing the destruction of 2000 square kilometres of Siberian 
forest.  The overhead detonation was equivalent to the explosive force of a 4 megaton 
bomb.11 In 2013, a 17-to 20-meter sized orbiting asteroid entered the atmosphere over 
Chelyabinsk, Russia and exploded with a force of 500 kilotons. The impact event 
                                                          
8 NASA, Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives, Report to the Congress 
(March 2007), p. 7, online:  <http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/171331main_NEO_report_march07.pdf>, (last 
visited on 15 January 2018). 
9 Center for NEO Studies (CNEOS), online:  <https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/about/target_earth.html> (last 
visited on 15 January 2018). 
10 See details in C. Chapman., Impact lethality and risks in today’s world: Lessons for interpreting Earth 
history in C. Koeberl and K. MacLeod. (eds), Catastrophic Events and Mass Extinctions: Impacts and 
Beyond, Geological Society of America Special Paper 356, Colorado 2002, pp. 7–19. 
11 Secure World Foundation, Near Earth Objects: Responding to the International Challenge, April 
2014 p. 6, online: < http://swfound.org/media/170684/SWF_NEOs-
Responding_to_the_International_Challenge_2014.pdf>(last visited on 15 January 2018). 
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caused injuries to about 1,600 people, with some of them having to be hospitalised from 
cuts caused by flying materials.12   
If the Tunguska or Chelyabinsk event had happened over a densely populated area of 
the world, it would have a catastrophic effect causing the death of millions of people. 
The fact that these two events happened within the relatively short period of 100 years 
must serve as a wake-up call for the international community to adopt collective and 
holistic measures.  
 
2. Methodology of threat mitigation 
Unlike the dinosaurs’ age, recent developments in space science and technology enable 
humanity to take preventive action. Scientists can predict whether an object can actually 
serve as a threat by detecting and categorising NEOs.  Technology also allows for the 
successful prevention or mitigation of a hazardous NEO’s impact.  
 
2.1 Detection of NEOs 
The detection and tracking of NEOs is the first and fundamental step in designing 
efficient mitigation strategies. To “know your enemy” enables appropriate planning for 
its defeat. The orbit of an object defines if, when, and how a strike may occur, as well 
as the warning times and deflection requirements.13  
The identification of NEOs can be done with the aid of ground-based or space-based 
systems.  
Ground based systems use large field of optical sensors to scan for NEOs during the 
night. They cannot function during daylight or twilight and their operation can be 
interfered by weather, atmospheric turbulence, scattering from moonlight, and 
atmospheric attenuation. Nevertheless, ground systems, compared to space based ones, 
are easier to build, verify, operate, maintain and upgrade.14  NEO identification is 
currently being achieved by a range of ground instruments.  The development of Space 
Surveillance Telescope15 is anticipated to bridge gaps in observational coverage by 
enabling the detection and tracking of small objects in deep space.16   
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 Small Bodies Assessment Group (SBAG), Goals Document  Goal II: Planetary Defense, Draft version 
0.5 (26/6/2015), p. 1, online:  http://www.lpi.usra.edu/sbag/goals/Goal_II_sbag_pdg_draft0.5.pdf 
(last visited on 15 January 2018). 
14NASA, supra note 8, p. 8. 
15 It is developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory for the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects agency and the U.S. Air Force. For more info see 
<http://www.darpa.mil/program/space-surveillance-telescope> (last visited on 15 January 2018). 
16 Chile is also developing the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope which is anticipated to be operational 
in 2020. For more info see <http://www.lsst.org/>(last visited on 15 January 2018).  
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Space-based systems are capable to scan the entire sky at any given time without any 
interference17. It should be noted, however, that space-based systems are more 
expensive to develop and they run the risk of launch and deployment failure. 
Additionally, space-based systems are likely to have shorter lifetime. This may 
compromise the objectives of a NEO threat mitigation strategy, which may require the 
tracking of NEOs for extended periods of time.18 
After identifying the objects, their physical characteristics are determined. This is vital 
in order to predict the impact risk on Earth, as well as to calculate the object’s response 
to a mitigation mission. The characterisation of an object involves the determination of 
its composition, size, shape and rotation rate19. Radar observation is a powerful tool for 
characterising NEOs.  
 
2.2 Prevention or mitigation of the impact 
The most effective method to avert a NEO impact on Earth is to change its orbit. This 
can be achieved by using energy to change its velocity, so that it arrives sooner or later 
than Earth at the point of intersection.20 With advance warning of many years, a change 
in the velocity of a NEO by only few centimetres per second can successfully cause the 
object to miss the Earth21. Several techniques have been proposed over the years to shift 
a NEOS trajectory.  
One such technique is the kinetic impactor, according to which a NEO is deflected after 
an impact by a spacecraft, which causes a slight shift of the orbit. In essence, the 
spacecraft hits the NEO at high relative velocity, so that the object’s speed immediately 
changes because of the energy and momentum exchange.22  Another technique is the 
gravity tractor, in which a spacecraft flies alongside a NEO for a certain period of time, 
gradually pushing it off course through the small gravitational attraction between the 
two. Moreover, the blast deflection technique requires the use of nuclear explosives 
near the NEO causing its outer layers to evaporate, changing in that way its trajectory. 
Non-nuclear explosives can also be used to perform small or medium pushes to the 
NEO.23  
For the successful prevention or mitigation of a menacing NEO impact, time is of 
essence. In order to be able to plan and deploy a successful deflection mission, three 
elements are necessary: (a) sufficient advance warning of a minimum 10-15 years, (b) 
                                                          
17 Some of the current space based instruments are NASA’s NEOWISE and Canada’s NEOSSAT – see 
infra para. 3.2.  
18 NASA, supra note 8, p.9. 
19 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Planetary defence, online:< 
https://www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense/faq> 
20 International Academy of Astronautics supra note 6, p. 7. 
21 Ibid, p.8. 
22 International Academy of Astronautics, supra note 6, p. 8. 
23 Secure World Foundation, supra note 11, pp. 13-14. 
6 
 
deflection capability and (c) an international decision-making mechanism.24 These 
three elements enable the deflection campaign to proceed timely, so that the predicted 
impact is prevented.  
When preparing to prevent an impact, the communication with the public is also of 
utmost importance. A coordination plan should be developed detailing the nature of the 
threat, evacuation activities and instructions to the public. The aftermath of the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami and hurricane Katrina revealed that only realistic planning and 
preparation can minimise the chaos that is likely to occur.25  
 
3. Current efforts for threat mitigation 
Currently, efforts for NEO threat mitigation are undertaken mainly by international 
organisations and individual States.  At the same time, private initiatives have been 
developed. 
 
3.1 International organisations 
3.1.1. United Nations 
The United Nations (UN) have been undertaking significant work on NEOs, following 
the report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) in 1999,26 which encouraged the improvement of 
international cooperation on this issue. As a follow-up to this report, the UN Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), created the Action Team on Near-
Earth Objects, also referred to as Action Team 14 (AT-14),27 which comprises scientific 
and space agency delegates from interested States and non-governmental organisations. 
In 2013, the UN General Assembly approved a series of concrete measures,28 to protect 
the Earth against hazardous NEOs. This important milestone resulted from a series of 
lengthy discussions in the UN COPUOS and AT-14. The measures approved involve, 
                                                          
24 Association of Space Explorers, Asteroid Threats: A Call for Global Response (25 September 2008), 
p.14 online:  <http://www.space-explorers.org/ATACGR.pdf> (last visited on 15 January 2018). 
25 International Academy of Astronautics, supra note 6, p.9.  
26 Report of the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, Vienna, 19-30 July 1999 (18 October 1999), A/CONF.184/6, online:  
<http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/unispace/ACONF184_6E.pdf >(last visited on 15 January 2018). 
27 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Fifty-sixth Session (2001), A/56/20, 
online:  http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gadocs/A_56_20E.pdf (last visited 15 January 2018). 
28 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 2013 (16 December 2013),   
A/RES/68/7520, online:  http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/75 (last 
visited on 15 January 2018). 
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inter alia, the creation of an International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN) and a 
Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG).29    
 
3.1.1.1 International Asteroid Warning Network 
The IAWN is tasked with the coordination of an international group of organisations 
involved in detecting, tracking, and characterising NEOs. IAWN also acts as an 
international coordination service for processing alerts about possible threats. 
Furthermore, IAWN will develop a strategy to assist Governments in the analysis of 
asteroid impact consequences and the planning of mitigation responses. Currently, there 
are eight official signatories to the IAWN Statement of Intent.30 
 
3.1.1.2 Space Mission Planning Advisory Group 
The SMPAG is comprised of voluntary representatives of Member States with space 
agencies. Its purpose is to prepare an international response to a NEO impact threat by 
exchanging information, promoting collaborative research and mission opportunities, 
as well as planning activities for NEO threat mitigation.31Since 2016, as per the General 
Assembly resolution 71/90, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs serves 
as the permanent secretariat to SMPAG.32 
 
3.1.2. European Union  
In the framework of the European Union, the European Commission has funded the 
NEOshield project which aims at improving our knowledge on NEOs physical 
characteristics and investigating the effectiveness of asteroid threat-reduction 
techniques. The NEOshield project was undertaken by research institutes, universities 
and industrial partners in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, and in the U.S. 
and Russia. Since 2015, the work continues with NEOshield-2 which aims to 
                                                          
29 These measures were initially proposed by the Association of Space Explorers (ASE) in their report, 
Asteroid Threats: A Call for Global Response (2008), see supra note 24.  ASE recommended that the UN 
should support asteroid warning and information sharing, mission operations planning as well as 
authorization and oversight functions. The report was submitted to UN COPUOS in 2009 for 
consideration and subsequent action. The UN COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, its NEO 
Working Group, and AT-14 discussed and refined these proposals.  
30 For more info see  United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, online: 
<http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/neos/iawn.html> (last visited 15 January 2018) 
31 See SMPAG Terms of Reference, online:  http://www.cosmos.esa.int/web/smpag/terms-of-
reference-v0 (last visited on 15 January 2018). 
32 See United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs online: 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/neos/smpag.html ((last visited 15 January 2018)) 
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investigate in more detail technologies critical to NEOs deflection missions as well as 
to refine NEOs characterization.33  
 
3.1.3. European Space Agency  
The European Space Agency (ESA) has developed a multi-segment Space Situational 
Awareness (SSA) Programme. Its aim is to detect, predict, and assess the risk to life 
and property due to man-made space debris objects, harmful space weather and 
potential impacts of NEOs. The objective of SSA's Near-Earth Object Segment is to 
raise awareness of the current and future position of NEOs in relation to Earth, to 
estimate the likelihood of impacts, to assess the consequences of any possible impact 
and to develop NEO deflection methods.34 The data collected from telescopes is 
retrieved by the NEO Coordination Centre (NEOCC). In the event of a high risk impact 
predictions, the data will be cross-checked with NASA’s SENTRY system which is 
operated by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).35  
Moreover in 2014, Philae, a robotic lander, successfully achieved the first ever landing 
on the surface of a comet, as part of ESA’s Rosetta mission. Until the end of the mission 
in 2016, Philae took images which will assist scientists to study and learn more on the 
composition of comets and on their role in the evolution of the Solar System. This 
knowledge will significantly help in the planning of threat- mitigation techniques. 
 
3.1.3. European Union  
In the framework of the European Union, the European Commission has funded the 
NEOshield project which aims at improving our knowledge on NEOs physical 
characteristics and investigating the effectiveness of asteroid threat-reduction 
techniques. The NEOshield project was undertaken by research institutes, universities 
and industrial partners in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, and in the U.S. 
and Russia. Since 2015, the work continues with NEOshield-2 which aims to 
investigate in more detail technologies critical to NEOs deflection missions as well as 
to refine NEOs characterization.36  
 
                                                          
33 See Neoshield 2 Project, online: <http://www.neoshield.eu/science-technology-asteroid-impact/> 
((last visited on 15 January 2018). 
34 For more info see European Space Agency (ESA), online: 
<http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Situational_Awareness/Near-Earth_Objects_-
_NEO_Segment> (last visited on 15 January 2018).  
35 See European Space Agency (ESA), online: 
<http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Situational_Awareness/Near-Earth_Objects_-
_NEO_Segment> (last visited on 15 January 2018) 
36 See Neoshield 2 Project, online: <http://www.neoshield.eu/science-technology-asteroid-impact/> 
((last visited on 15 January 2018). 
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3.2. Individual States 
3.2.1. United States of America 
The US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a leading 
role in the prevention of NEOs impact. Planetary defence has been gaining particular 
attention in the US and it is within the nation’s top –tier space policy issues.37  
Already in 1998, the US Congress directed NASA to locate at least 90 percent of all 
NEOs with a diameter of 1 km or greater within the period of 10 years. NASA and its 
partners managed to achieve this goal in 2011. Additionally, NASA’s Authorization 
Act of 2005,38 set a far more challenging task for NASA, i.e. to detect, track, catalogue, 
and characterise 90 percent of all NEOs with a diameter of 140 meters or greater by 
2020.39 
The vast majority of NEO discoveries have been the result of NASA-supported ground-
based telescopic surveys including the Catalina Sky Survey (CSS) and Spacewatch near 
Tucson, Arizona; the LINEAR project near Socorro, New Mexico; Pans-STARRS1 on 
Haleakala, Maui, Hawaii; LONEOS near Flagstaff, Arizona; and the NEAT project run 
by NASA/JPL. Also the NEOWISE project has been reactivated to discover and 
characterise asteroids using a near-infrared space telescope in an Earth polar orbit.40 
The technological progress and the appropriate funding has enabled increased 
discovery of NEOs over the last years. This is demonstrated by the large NEO catalogue 
maintained by the Minor Planet Center (MPC) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which 
collects and distributes data to the international community.41  
In 2016, NASA established a Planetary Defense Coordination Office (PDCO), with the 
mission to safeguard the early detection of potentially hazardous objects – asteroids and 
comets with a size capable to reach Earth’s surface and whose orbits can bring them 
within 0.05 Astronomical Units of Earth. The PDCO uses data from projects supported 
by NASA’s Near-Earth Object (NEO) Observations Program.42 
                                                          
37 See National Space Policy of the United States of America, (28 June 2010) p. 4, online:  
<http://history.nasa.gov/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf> (last visited on 15 January 2018) and 
NASA Strategic Plan 2014, p.8, online:  
http://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/FY2014_NASA_SP_508c.pdf (last visited on 15 January 
2018). 
38 Also known as the George E. Brown, Jr. Near-Earth Object Survey Act. 
39 Section 321 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law No. 109-155), online:  
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ155/pdf/PLAW-109publ155.pdf> (last visited on 15 
January 2018). The programme, however, has been unsuccessful so far, owing to administrative and 
budget restraints – see http://phys.org/news/2014-09-nasa-asteroid-defense-falls-short.html (last 
visited on 15 January 2018).  
40 See CNEOS, NEO Search Programme, online  <http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/programs/intro.html> (last 
visited on 15 January 2018).  
41 Secure World Foundation, supra note 11, p.8. 
42 For more information see NASA, Planetary Defence Coordination Office, online: 
<https://www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense/overview> (last visited on 15 January 2018) 
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3.2.2. Canada  
In 2013, Canada launched the Near-Earth Object Surveillance Satellite (NEOSSat). It 
is the world's first space telescope dedicated to detecting and tracking asteroids and 
satellites. It performs a circle of the globe every 100 minutes, scanning space near the 
Sun for hazardous asteroids. Thanks to its location, it can spot asteroids which are 
difficult to track with ground telescopes and it can operate 24/7 without any 
limitations.43  
 
3.2.3. Russian Federation 
The Russian Federation is working on an SSA programme to detect, inter alia, 
hazardous NEOs. The International Scientific Optical Network (ISON), a growing 
international network of small telescopes linked together, is a major contributor in 
establishing an SSA programme.  Additionally, Russia also operates several radar 
telescopes for characterization of identified asteroids, while planning to build several 
new ones. Russia is also looking to build and launch a space-based NEO telescope by 
2021.44 
 
3.2.4 Japan 
Japan has successfully completed the Hayabusa mission, which collected samples from 
a small asteroids named Itokawa and returned them to Earth in June 2010. In 2014 the 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) successfully launched its Hayabusa2 
mission to rendezvous with an asteroid, land a small probe plus three mini rovers on its 
surface, and then return samples to Earth. NASA and JAXA are cooperating on the 
science of the mission.45 
 
3.3 Private initiatives 
The Spaceguard Foundation, is a private, non-profit international organisation, set-up 
in 1996 and based in Italy.  Its objective is to study, discover and observe NEOs and to 
protect the Earth environment against NEO impact threats.46  
                                                          
43 For more info see Canadian Space Agency, online: <http://www.asc-
csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/neossat/>  (last visited on 15 January 2018). 
44 Secure World Foundation, supra note 11, p. 8-9.  
45 See NASA Science Beta, Japan Launches Asteroid Mission, (4 December 2014) online: 
http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2014/04dec_hayabusa2/ (last visited on 15 
January 2018). 
46 See The Spaceguard Foundation, online: <http://spaceguard.rm.iasf.cnr.it/SGF/INDEX.html >(last 
visited on 15 January 2018). 
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The Emergency Asteroid Defence Project (EADP) is a Danish non-governmental 
organisation, which includes scientists, engineers and other interested persons trying to 
raise $200k on crowdfunding website Indiegogo, to continue its research into 
hypervelocity asteroid intercept vehicles (HAIVs) designed to deflect or disperse 
asteroids and comets with only a few days’ warning.47 
 
3.4 Evaluation of current efforts 
All these efforts move to the correct direction and represent significant steps for 
alleviating the threat posed by NEOs. Nevertheless, they are inefficient, because they 
lack coordination, appropriate funding and technical resources. In this regard, one could 
mention the 2014 Report in NASA’s Inspector General48 which states that due to 
administrative and budget restraints as well as organisational weaknesses, NASA will 
not be able to detect, track, catalogue, and characterise 90 percent of all NEOs with a 
diameter of 140 meters or greater by 2020 as required by the NASA’s Authorization 
Act of 2005.    
Planetary defence is a global and complicated issue and at the same time crucial for the 
well-being and the survival of our species. Therefore, efforts should be organized at a 
global scale. 
4. Proposal for an international approach 
4.1 Background: Risk perception and risk management 
Eric Posner, writing in 2004, argued that the need for organising a planetary defence 
system is underestimated despite the catastrophic potential of NEOs.49 The reasons 
behind this trend are “… a combination of the science-fiction label that has become 
attached to the menace, the lack of any history of casualties being caused by 
asteroids…, and the sense that concern with such low-probability dangers would be a 
distraction from the struggle against international terrorism”.50  
His findings should not come as a surprise to the scientific community. A survey, that 
took place in 1992 in the USA, revealed “modest support for detection efforts but 
considerable opposition to the use of weapons in space, even to deflect a threatening 
asteroid. The survey respondents indicated a strong preference for collecting more data 
on the risk before developing a defence system”.51 This preference run (partially) 
                                                          
47 See Emergency Asteroid Defence Project, online: <http://eadproject.com/> (last visited on 15 
January 2018). 
48 NASA’s Efforts to Identify Near-Earth Objects and Mitigate Hazards,  Audit report (15 September 
2014) online: <https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY14/IG-14-030.pdf> (last visited on 15 January 
2018). 
49 R. Posner, Catastrophe. Risk and response (OUP 2004), pp.28-29.  
50 Ibid., p. 250. 
51 P. Slovic, “Perception of risk from asteroid impact” in P. Bobrowsky and H.  Rickman (eds.) 
Comet/Asteroid impacts and human society (Springer 2007), pp. 369,  379. 
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against the perception among the same respondents that NEO risks were “extreme with 
regard to being unknown to scientists and the public, distant in time (non-immediate), 
uncontrollable and catastrophic”.52  
What both works reveal is the central role that risk perceptions play in the regulation of 
risk events. In the words of Ulrich Beck “the perception of threatening risks determines 
thought and action” in modern risk societies.53 As such, the following paradox has been 
created. The quest for safety against risk events which “transcend traditional boundaries 
of time and space” preoccupies the Western societies.54 Yet, this quest is not necessarily 
guided by probabilistic risk analysis, but is very much influenced by the (fears and) 
reactions of the public to (the threat of) risk events.   
As such, the developer of a regulatory system addressing catastrophic risks is required 
to manage social perceptions, as much as real risks. This is not an easy task, as it only 
takes the occurrence of a risk event to lead to, what Ulrich Beck describes as, the “the 
de-bounding of risk perceptions and fantasies”.55 A collision between a NEO and the 
Earth that causes death and property damage in a large scale, is a first-rate opportunity 
for the media, provided Earth is saved from annihilation, to amplify its consequences 
by creating a (more or very) dramatic version of reality. Similar past events have not 
caused such reaction either because they took place before living memory or they were 
near-misses in the sense that they resulted in relatively limited damages - at least 
compared to what could have been.56   
From the legal standpoint, the most important part of this amplification process will be 
the search for culpable parties among those who were in charge of managing such risks. 
One might argue that this search for culpability is a far-fetched scenario in the case of 
NEOs, as i) a collision between an asteroid and the Earth cannot be attributed to 
technology;57 and ii) the scientists dealing with their detection/mitigation seem to enjoy 
a high degree of credibility by the media: “apparently the media had treated their 
activities in a positive light and had not interpreted their public statements as 
particularly ill-founded or self-serving”.58   
However, history suggests that media are quick to change attitudes vis-à-vis scientists 
and risk managers in the aftermath of risk events. In their attempt to capitalise on the 
“impact factor” (no pun intended) of risk events, they construct them as the result of 
moral failures of risk managers.59 Risk events, man-made or natural, are the result of 
their personal traits and mental processes, such as forgetfulness, inattention, poor 
                                                          
52 Ibid.  
53 U Beck, World risk society (Polity Press 1999), p. 135.  
54 G. Mythen, Ulrich Beck: A critical introduction to the risk society (Pluto Press 2004), p. 22. 
55U Beck, supra note 53, p.  44.    
56 See supra para. 1.2.   
57 R. Posner, supra note 49, p. 24.  
58 P. Slovic, supra, note 51, p. 380.  
59 T. Horlick-Jones, “Modern disasters as outrage and betrayal”(1995) 13 International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters, pp. 305, 311. 
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motivation, carelessness, and recklessness.60 For how long this perception lasts depends 
on the gravity of the risk event in question and the post-event reactions of the industry 
and States.   
The fact that the collision of an asteroid with the Earth is a natural event is irrelevant to 
this construction. The more accurate the identification of NEOs and the avoidance of 
collisions becomes, the more vulnerable to a legal action the bodies in charge will be. 
As the actual risk-creator is absent, the search for culpability moves to the human actors 
who allegedly facilitated the collision by missing the NEO or did not take the 
appropriate mitigating action as a result of a judgment error. The actions filed against 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the aftermath of the 
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004, surprising and frivolous as they were, 
demonstrate the issue at hand.61 The search for culpability is not restricted to the risk 
creator but, in its absence, extends to those in charge of monitoring the risk situation 
and issuing warnings about imminent risk events.  
As a result, any future regulation of NEOs should not be limited on their quantitative 
aspect, but also embrace their qualitative elements in equal measure. This will only be 
achieved if the scheme has the following dual scope. 
Firstly, it should facilitate the advancement of R&D on the identification and mitigation 
of the risks associated with NEOs. The overarching aim in this part is to satisfy the 
demand for collecting more data on the actual risks posed by NEOs, setting accurate 
early warning systems, identifying remedial actions at a global level and creating 
emergency response protocols in cases of accidents. Currently, the scientific 
community has a much better understanding of the risks posed by NEOs compared to 
1992 when the survey was published.62 This development has been achieved despite 
the limited funding and the persisting doubts about the credibility of the threat posed 
by NEOs. The results demonstrate that the regulators cannot afford to ignore the said 
risks anymore. Not surprisingly, the international space community has started to 
discuss the potential and the form of a future international regulation. The creation of 
the IAWN and the SMPAG is a step to the right direction.63 Yet, it shall be treated as 
the first step towards a comprehensive international regulation of NEO risks. 
Secondly, it should deal with the legal aftermath of an accident. The overarching aim 
in this part is to create a system that contains the “de-bounding of risk perceptions” and 
its ensuing effects by separating culpability from compensation. It is to be hoped that 
this distinction would create incentives for cooperation and trust-building among the 
                                                          
60  J. Reason, “Human error. Models and management” (2000) 172 West J Med, pp. 393-396. 
61 For details on the history of the claims see A. Ito, Legal aspects of satellite remote sensing (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2011), pp. 191-194 and University of Nebraska-Lincoln’s Programme on Space and 
Telecommunications Law, “Legal Aspects of NEO Threat Response and Related Institutional Issues. 
Final Report” (9 February 2010), para. 4.3, online: Secure World Foundation, online: 
<http://swfound.org/media/40426/legal_aspects_neo_response_institutional_issues_final_report.pd
f>(last visited on 15 January 2018). 
62 Supra Ch. 3.  
63 Supra para.3.1.1.  
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various actors involved. Any alternative would lead to adjudication and 
blameworthiness that will inevitably erode the fundamental aim of such system, namely 
the effective protection against the risk of NEOs.  
The debate over the structure of a scheme dealing with NEOs is a nascent one with 
many avenues to explore. Understandably, the spatial constraints of this publication do 
not permit an all-inclusive analysis. Yet, the aim of this part of the paper is to contribute 
to the debate by providing “food for thought” to the drafters of a future scheme.  
 
4.2 Policy considerations in establishing the Fund 
Very few States have the technical capability to manage the risks posed by NEOs. They 
lead the way in R&D, yet they are required to work within the framework of the 
fundamental principles of space law, namely the use of outer space for the benefit of 
humankind and in the interest of promoting international co-operation and 
understanding, taking into consideration the interests of all State Parties to the Outer 
Space Treaty.64 These principles call for the creation of a scheme that has the interests 
of humankind at its centre, ideally involving all States in the decision-making process; 
with arguably the most pressing issue being the establishment of a duty of “international 
co-operation and assistance on planetary defence”.65  
At the same time, the creation of a scheme dealing with NEOs at a global level would 
be a challenge for regulators from a risk management perspective unlike anything seen 
until today. The reason of this challenge is not necessarily the catastrophic potential of 
NEOs. It is the sui generis nature of such system that is required to have an all-inclusive 
risk management role: provide financial support for developing technology to identify 
and mitigate NEOs (precautionary risk management); decide on the appropriate course 
of action in the case of detecting, early enough, that an NEO is in a collision path with 
the earth (proactive risk management); and deal with the aftermath of a collision in 
terms of employing the necessary emergency and investigation protocols, making funds 
available for funding the rescue efforts and compensating victims (reactive risk 
management).   
Such a tripartite structure is not common in the international or national field. Most 
schemes dealing with risk events handle (part of) their reactive risk management 
function by acting in lieu or on top of the cover provided by commercial insurers. The 
common denominator behind the International Civil Aviation Compensation Fund 
(ICACF-aviation terrorism),66 the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds 
                                                          
64 Arts I, III and IV of the 1963 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.  
65 The analysis of this duty is outside the scope of this paper.  
66 The ICACF is set up by the 2009 Convention on Compensation for Damage to Third Parties, Resulting 
from Acts of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft. As of 4 August 2015 the Convention has not 
entered into force.  
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(IOPC funds - oil pollution at sea),67 the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 
(CICS - violent crime in Great Britain), the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB - road 
accidents in the UK) and the schemes for the risks posed by nuclear power plants 68 is 
that they “socialise” the financial burden of relevant risk events. This is achieved i) by 
creating a system where the various commercial actors involved in the relevant risk-
generating activity (including consumers in ICACF and (indirectly) in MIB) pay out 
admissible claims, most often but not necessarily, via a Fund set up for this purpose 
(ICACF, IOPC, MIB); ii) by creating a clear obligation for States to foot the bill of the 
risk event on the basis of policy reasons (CICS); or iii) by combining the two, creating 
a system where the contributions towards compensation are coming from both 
commercial actors and governments (nuclear power plant risks).    
Understandably, one might wonder why such a “light” structure is not recommended in 
the case of NEOs. 
One reason is political and has been one of the drawbacks of ICACF: depositing a few 
billion dollars in an international organisation to deal with the effects of a low 
probability risk event does not appeal to contributors, especially in times of austerity. 
The most often utilised schemes cover either high(er) probability risk events (IOPC 
funds, MIB), are set up and administered by domestic governments based on their 
policy choices (CICS), or support industries that are considered desirable despite their 
potential for catastrophe (nuclear power plants). In that respect, it is expected that the 
establishment of a compensatory-only scheme for NEOs will go nowhere. It will face 
reluctance from most governments to commit funds for dealing with the aftermath of a 
risk that might never materialise in the lifetime of their voters. This is so, of course, 
unless a catastrophic event involving NEOs takes place.   
Secondly, the establishment of a compensation-only fund will address the arguably less 
relevant (at the moment) issue of recovery. That will leave in a state of flux the most 
pressing issues of funding, which are the loss-prevention research and finding avenues 
of consensus in managing the relevant risks. At the same time, such choice will fail to 
lay the groundwork for creating a co-operative decision-making system, as it will be 
limited to (a small part of) the post-accident phase of NEO-related events. In essence, 
all that it will do is to postpone the creation of a framework that will reconcile issues of 
sovereignty with best practices of risk management formulated by the few technically-
capable States. Can this be interpreted as giving permission to the said states to proceed 
                                                          
67  The Funds are set up by the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
the 1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage and the Protocol of 2003 to the 1992 International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. 
68 See the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as amended by 
the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964, by the Protocol of 16th November 1982 and the 2004 
Protocol to amend the 1960 Paris Convention as amended. See also the 1963 Convention 
supplementary to the 1960 Paris Convention as amended. Finally see the 1963 Vienna Convention in 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, as amended by the 1997 Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna 
Convention and the 2007 Vienna Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.  
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with their endeavours in a unilateral manner? Probably not; yet, it will certainly 
steadfastly ignore the elephant in the room.    
Similarly, suggestions to create “light” structures by focusing on specific legal issues, 
such as the use of nuclear weapons to prevent collisions,69 shall be dismissed. They 
contribute minimally to the main aim of identifying the risks and enhancing our 
defences at a global level. At the same time, they are, on their own, a “hard sell” to 
governments which feel that they have limited space for compromise when the 
negotiating agenda is so restricted.  
In that respect, it is submitted that the most appropriate way forward is to set up a 
holistic scheme that will regulate all three risk management phases of NEO risks. 
Setting up such a scheme  might take longer than opting for a fragmented, piecemeal 
framework. Yet, its creation is expected to satisfy all relevant interests, legal and 
operational, provided it is designed in a manner that promotes flexibility in decision-
making. The flexibility is essential in order to counteract one of the main arguments 
against such grand design, namely that it will impair the effectiveness of mitigating 
actions and emergency responses: “…states [with technical capabilities] might resent 
detailed interference with an actual mitigation campaign, and more likely still might 
not accept being ordered to act by an international body, even if it would be a Security 
Council of which they themselves might be members” .70 
However, this is a misplaced argument. The examples of organisations such as ICAO 
and, to a lesser extent, IMO demonstrate that the creation of international legal norms 
via international organisations can be beneficial to the development of global industries 
that rely on R&D. Admittedly, the said international organisations do not have as broad 
a mandate as the one suggested in this paper. Yet, they have proven that collective 
decision-making can add value to the regulated activity. In that respect, one should not 
overlook the practical and educational value of having an international forum dealing 
with the entire risk management process. Creating such a hub is expected to stimulate 
a multidisciplinary dialogue early in the process of drafting best practices and legal 
norms, making them as fit for purpose as possible. The importance of such practice 
cannot be overstated as it will be beneficial to the fast(er) development of our planetary 
defence system and will fit like a glove with the philosophy of communality of space. 
What follows is a few ideas on the structure of a future scheme on the management of 
the risks posed by NEOs on the basis of our analysis so far. 
  
4.3 Creation of an international planetary-defence organisation 
                                                          
69 See H. Mayer, “Is a special legal regime for planetary defence measures necessary?” (6 June 2015),  
online: International Academy of Astronautics 
http://iaaweb.org/iaa/Scientific%20Activity/conf/pdc2015/IAA-PDC-15-06-06po.pdf  (last visited on 15 
January 2018).   
70Nebraska legal report, supra note 61, para. 6.8.  
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It is recommended that the scheme is set up by means of an international treaty (the 
Treaty) that will be the constitution of an international organisation (the Organisation) 
with its own legal personality and system of governance. This way it will enjoy 
independence from existing schemes, its structure will reflect the idiosyncrasies of 
NEOs and a message will be given that the international community takes the relevant 
risks seriously. 
 
4.3.1 Structure 
It is important that that this Organisation deals with both the quantitative and the 
qualitative aspect of the risk of NEOs. To achieve this, it is essential to have a structure 
that i) facilitates collective decision-making even in periods of crisis; ii) provides for 
the adoption of the necessary legal norms and best practices protocols; and iii) provides 
funding for research, prevention and crisis management, including the settlement of 
claims.   
It has been rightly suggested that the decision-making process at the highest level shall 
be based on the paradigm of the relationship between the UN Security Council and the 
UN General Assembly. This is so because “[i]n practice…the result will be individual 
or multilateral action by sovereign states acting within the confines of the mandate 
[given by the Council] but otherwise making their own decisions as to how to apply 
force”.71 Correct as this recommendation is, this relationship shall be replicated in the 
context of the new Organisation. In that respect the Organisation shall consist of a 
Council and an Assembly. The Council shall be entrusted with maintaining 
international safety against the threat of NEOs and the Assembly shall give legitimacy 
to its decisions, keeping a watchful eye on the interests of mankind.  
Nevertheless, the new scheme should not fit into the confines of the UN for the 
following two reasons. One reason that has already been advanced is that the replication 
will permit a restructuring of the membership of the new Council to represent the space 
capabilities of the State-Parties.72 An additional reason can be identified: the creation 
of an independent organisation would facilitate the creation of legal norms and best 
practices focusing on the risk management of NEOs. This can be achieved by 
incorporating organs similar to the IAWN and SMPAG (“IAWN” and “SMPAG”) into 
the structure of the Organisation, making them (with the necessary adjustments in terms 
of membership and mandate) the powerhouses of the Organisation. They can play the 
role of the Air Navigation Commission of ICAO where a group of nineteen aeronautical 
experts are responsible for proposing to the ICAO Council amendments to the existing 
technical Annexes to the Chicago Convention, as well as the creation of new Annexes.73 
“IAWN” shall be focusing on the precautionary risk management phase and “SMPAG” 
                                                          
71 Ibid, para.  6.7. 
72 Ibid., para 6.13.  
73 Articles 56 and 57 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago, on 7 December 
1944 (Chicago Convention). 
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on the proactive/reactive phases. They would consist of experts in their respective fields 
and one of their aims would be to draft relevant legal norms and best practices. Such 
norms would be recommended for adoption to the Council, which upon approval would 
submit them to the State-Parties. With them being finally approved, if the required 
number of State-Parties do not file objections against them within the time-frame 
prescribed by the Treaty.74  
It is important to note that the “IAWN” and “SMPAG” via subsidiary organs and 
national space agencies shall undertake a public awareness campaign about NEOs. 
Such a campaign shall inform the public about what NEOs are, the risks they pose to 
our life and the various mitigation methods that can be used to prevent collisions. The 
long-term aim of such campaign would be to persuade the public to support the funding 
for managing the risks of NEOs and at the same time to educate it to see through the 
biases of media in reporting risk events.  
 
4.3.2 Contributions to the Fund 
With respect to funding, it is important that the Treaty sets up a Fund (“the Fund”).The 
Fund shall be administered by the Secretariat that is headed by a Director. The Director 
shall be responsible for the management of the Fund and in particular its compliance 
with internal and external financial regulations. (S)he will also be in charge of all the 
functions of the Secretariat. The Secretariat will have a dual role. It will assist the 
Director in the management of the Fund by providing financial and legal expertise and 
at the same time provide administrative support to the Assembly and the Council.   
For building up the capacity of the Fund, it is necessary that all State Parties to the 
Treaty automatically become parties to the Fund and make the necessary financial 
contributions. The Fund shall not have a compensatory-only scope. Instead, it shall 
provide financial support to the State-Parties engaged in NEO-related research, cover 
the costs of mitigation campaigns taking place under the remit of the organisation, and 
be the exclusive source of compensation to victims of collisions, provided the loss 
occurs in the territory of a State-Party. For humanitarian reasons, the Treaty might make 
provision for non-State Parties to use the Fund in case of damage in their territory, upon 
approval of the Assembly and provided they commit to becoming Parties to the Treaty.  
It is recommended that the Treaty makes no pre-allocation of the funds to each of the 
three aims of the Fund. The funds could be allocated on a yearly basis by the Council 
to reflect the risk profile of NEOs and the state of research, always leaving a reserve to 
deal with a crisis. This decision of the Council shall be taken following a joint 
recommendation from the “IAWN” and the “SMPAG”. This arrangement is expected 
to give the necessary flexibility to put the funds in the best possible use in terms of 
managing the risks of NEOs on any given year. It is suggested that a more flexible 
decision-making process shall be adopted on how to spend the allocated funds: the 
Assembly, having agreed on broad guidelines, shall delegate the decisions on which 
                                                          
74 See also Article 90 of the Chicago Convention.   
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projects to be funded to the “IAWN” and “SMPAG”. This delegation of authority is 
justified on the basis that the role of “IAWN” and “SMPAG” will be to have a hands-
on role with respect to the three phases of NEOs management. Still, an emergency 
reallocation procedure shall be provided, in case the funds of the reactive risk 
management phase are not sufficient to cover the exposure of the Organisation to a risk 
event occurring in the midst of the year. 
The rate of contributions shall be decided by the Assembly. It can be based on a number 
of factors, such as the size of the country, its expenditures on research and whether it 
provides means for mitigating NEOs at a global level. The idea behind this suggestion 
is that bigger countries have a higher probability of being hit by an asteroid. At the same 
time, countries with no or little technical capability might be requested to offer more 
funds to support the ones that play an active role in the management of the risks. 
Admittedly, this is an area that the Organisation shall keep an open mind: if commercial 
activities ever take place in Space in mass, a “saving the humankind” levy might be 
imposed on their organisers.    
 
4.3.3 The function of the Fund     
In case a NEO either requires the launch of a mitigation campaign or causes personal 
injuries or property damage in a State-Party, the role of the Fund would be to contribute 
towards the cost of the campaign and/or the compensation of the victims. In that respect, 
the following three issues shall be addressed:  
 
4.3.3.1 International mandate for action 
Firstly, it has been rightly argued that the sharing of such costs by the international 
community should depend on the mitigation campaign taking place “within a mandate 
established by a concurrence of General Assembly and Security Council actions”;75 
without such mandate, the cost shall fall onto the State that took the unilateral action.76 
Harsh as this might sound, it is an important provision in order to establish the authority 
of the Organisation and make planetary defence a truly international attempt. Having 
said that, it is equally important that an emergency procedure is established to deal with 
situations that require immediate response leaving no time for seeking such mandate. 
That might provide for the urgent convening of the Council or for giving the mandate 
to “SMPAG” in advance to initiate the mitigation procedures subject to the urgent 
approval of the Council. An alternative already suggested is to adopt a procedure along 
the lines of the Emergency Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly.77 This 
procedure shall become part of the Treaty, yet its effectiveness might be limited by the 
fact that only very few States have the capability to operate mitigation campaigns. 
                                                          
75 Nebraska legal report, supra note 61, para. 6.9.  
76 Ibid., para. 6.10. 
77 Ibid., para. 6.6. 
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Unless they are on board, there is little that can be done by the rest of the international 
community. However, the establishment of a duty of “international co-operation and 
assistance on planetary defence” has the potential to change the dynamics of this 
relationship.   
 
4.3.3.2 Liability and risk management  
Secondly, grave doubts have been expressed about the suitability of the 1971 Liability 
Convention and/or other existing international norms to deal with questions of State 
liability that might arise in the process of managing NEOs risks.78 The drafters of the 
Treaty shall take the opportunity to end once and for all this debate by waiving the 
liability of the States participating in the research of NEOs and/or undertaking the 
mitigation/emergency response to a risk event. Such a waiver shall be broad enough to 
cover both the failure to warn and the failure to adequately mitigate the relevant NEO-
risk/manage the emergency response. The necessary condition for granting such 
immunity shall be for the States in question to operate within the remit of the 
Organisation and comply with the provisions of the Treaty. It has been suggested that 
the waiver shall be granted upon the additional condition that the response of the State 
in question was “a bona fide effort at NEO threat mitigation”.79 Identifying what 
constitutes “bona fide effort” shall be approached with caution, because it has the 
potential to invite litigation from the back door: it needs to be formulated clearly and 
precisely, avoiding legal terms, such as wilful misconduct or even reasonableness, that 
are subject to different interpretations from various legal systems.80 Admittedly, a wide 
immunity will face the reluctance of some States. Yet, it is the best way forward in 
setting the basis for a holistic system of planetary defence that aims to serve the 
international community against a natural risk.  
In essence, the Fund shall be responsible for settling the level of compensation paid to 
the victims, detaching the risk management process from questions of blameworthiness. 
The Treaty shall give exclusive jurisdiction to the Fund to settle claims in the aftermath 
of the risk event, with their negotiations performed by claim managers employed by the 
Fund as part of the “SMPAG”. In that respect, particular care shall be taken when 
identifying the types of damages to be recovered. The drafters might opt for a 
conservative approach, limiting them to death, personal injury, and property damage 
that are the direct consequence of the risk event. A liberal approach, which is witnessed 
in recent treaties dealing with the risks of nuclear power plants, is to identify the 
instances of recoverable economic losses, such as economic loss arising from personal 
or property damage, including the cost of restoring the damaged property, the loss of 
                                                          
78 Ibid., paras. 4.1 ff. 
79 Ibid., para 4.29. 
80 For a review of the varying interpretations of the term wilful misconduct in private international law 
conventions refer to M Clarke, International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR (Informa Law from 
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income incurred as a result of the damage/destruction of the property and the cost of 
taking measures following the collision to prevent further damage. Considering the 
catastrophic potential of collisions with NEOs, a limit on a per claim basis shall be set 
in the Treaty, especially if the drafters opt for a liberal definition of the term damage. 
Setting such a limit is important as it will assist the calculation of the contributions to 
the Fund and will make less likely a scenario where the Fund runs out of money before 
compensating the victims. At the same time, a provision giving priority to claims for 
personal injury over property damage shall be included in the eventuality that there are 
not enough funds to cover both of them.  
Distinguishing culpability from recovery is important for an additional reason. It gives 
the message that “we are all in this together”, contributing, as such, in the trust-building 
exercise and the normalisation of life that slowly takes place after every risk event. 
Litigation will inevitably slow down this process, as its adversarial characteristics will 
bring to the public nothing but disappointment and a sense of betrayal, especially if 
accompanied by delays in receiving the compensation.81  
It would be impossible to create a liability system that is immune from litigation. Still, 
the opportunities to litigate in the aftermath of a NEO-risk event shall be limited to the 
following two occasions: i) the victims shall be given the right to bring an action against 
the Fund before the courts of the place where the damage took place in case the 
settlement negotiations fail; and ii) the Fund shall be given the right to recover from 
States (Parties or not) that acted unilaterally causing or facilitating damage that was 
covered by the Fund. It is important that the right of recourse against non-conforming 
States is retained by the Fund so that the victims are compensated without delay 
following the risk event and are not involved in a process that might require sensitive 
diplomatic negotiations. These (most probably) protracted and expensive attempts for 
recovery shall fall on an Institution that has the means to deal with such eventuality.  
 
4.3.3.3 Parallel establishment of domestic funds 
Thirdly, it is important that the Treaty permits domestic funds to be set up dealing with 
compensation. States might set these up if they are willing to give compensation to their 
residents on top of the limits provided by the Fund. However, the conditions under 
which these funds will provide compensation shall be aligned to the requirements of 
the Treaty, i.e. types of recoverable damages. Their only function would be to pay 
additional compensation to the victims without any rights of recourse shall be left to 
the Fund to pursue.  
 
5. Conclusion 
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In conclusion, NEOs represent a major, yet underestimated, threat to our planet and 
possibly to our future as species. The current efforts undertaken are inefficient, because 
they are not globally coordinated and have limited financial resources.  
The most appropriate solution would be to create an international organisation that will 
be in charge of the three risk management phases of NEOs, i.e. financial support for 
R&D related to identification and mitigation of NEOs (precautionary risk 
management), decision-making mechanisms to face an imminent NEO threat (proactive 
risk management) and funding the rescue efforts and compensating victims (reactive 
risk management). This would be a sui generis construction that reflects the unique 
characteristics of NEOs.  
The analysis in this paper is by no means exhaustive. It purports to contribute to the 
dialogue that (reluctantly) takes place on the future regulation of NEOs by arguing that 
the effectiveness of our planetary defences requires unique regulatory solutions. In that 
respect, it is suggested that the drafters of such scheme shall be prepared to break away 
from traditional methods of international regulation which limit themselves on 
mitigating the effects of a risk event rather than preventing its occurrence. The 
catastrophic potential of the risk that we are dealing with leaves no other option.  
 
 
